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Abstract
Given video data from multiple personal devices or street cameras, can we exploit
the structural and dynamic information to learn dynamic representation of objects
for applications such as distributed surveillance, without storing data at a central
server that leads to a violation of user privacy? In this work, we introduce Federated
Dynamic Graph Neural Network (Feddy), a distributed and secured framework to
learn the object representations from multi-user graph sequences: i) It aggregates
structural information from nearby objects in the current graph as well as dynamic
information from those in the previous graph. It uses a self-supervised loss of
predicting the trajectories of objects. ii) It is trained in a federated learning manner.
The centrally located server sends the model to user devices. Local models on
the respective user devices learn and periodically send their learning to the central
server without ever exposing the user’s data to server. iii) Studies showed that the
aggregated parameters could be inspected though decrypted when broadcast to
clients for model synchronizing, after the server performed a weighted average.
We design an appropriate aggregation mechanism of secure aggregation primitives
that can protect the security and privacy in federated learning with scalability.
Experiments on four video camera datasets (in four different scenes) as well as
simulation demonstrate that Feddy achieves great effectiveness and security.
1 Introduction
Distributed surveillance systems have the ability to detect, track, and snapshot objects moving
around in a certain space [43]. The system is composed of several smart cameras (e.g., personal
devices or street cameras) that are equipped with a high-performance onboard computing and
communication infrastructure and a central server that processes data [9]. Smart survelliance is
getting increasingly popular as machine learning technologies (ML) become easier to use [10].
Traditionally, Convolutional Neural Networks (CNNs) were integrated in the cameras and employed
to identify and segment objects from video streams [45]. Then raw features (e.g., color, position)
of objects were sent to the server and used to train a learning model for tracking and/or anomaly
detection. In order to render a model for making accurate decisions, it has to learn higher-level
features and patterns from multi-user or multi-source video data. The model is expected to obtain
complex patterns such as vehicles slowing down at traffic circles, stopping at traffic lights, and
bicyclists cutting in and out of traffic in an unsupervised way.
Graph neural networks (GNNs) have been applied to capture deep patterns in vision data across
different problems such as object detection [45], situation recognition [25], and traffic forecasting
[26, 46]. When objects are identified, a video frame can be presented as a graph where nodes are the
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objects and links describe the spatial relationship between objects. Yet there are three challenges we
identify when designing and deploying GNN models in the distributed surveillance system.
First, an effective, annotation-free task is desired for training a GNN model on long graph sequences.
The models are expected to preserve the deep spatial and dynamic moving patterns as described
above in the latent representations of objects [29, 47, 38, 35]. Second, collecting raw video or graph
data from a large number of devices and training on a central server would not be a feasible solution,
though we need one global model [22, 6, 44]. After being deployed on real hardware, the GNN model
should be updated locally at each device as needed, or “fine-tuned” with newly-collected local data,
to adapt to unique scenarios so it can make decisions on-the-fly. When there are sufficient resources
(e.g., communication bandwidth), the model updates can be shared among the devices to let them
agree on the global model, which captures various deep patterns learned from individual devices or
users. Third, distributed systems are vulnerable to various inference attacks [14, 42, 31]. Namely,
adversaries who observe the updates of individual models are able to infer significant information
about the individual training datasets (e.g., distribution or even samples of the training datasets)
[1, 32]. When the central server is compromised, individual datasets are compromised as well with
the inference attacks.
In this work, we propose a novel approach called Federated Dynamic Graph Neural Network (Feddy)
to address the three challenges. Generally, it is an unsupervised, distributed, secured framework to
learn the object representations in graph sequences from several users or devices.
i) We define an MSE loss on the task of future position prediction to train the GNN model. Given
node attributes and relational links in a graph sequence before time t, the model generates the latent
representation of nodes in the graph of time t via neural aggregation functions, and it learns the
parameters to predict the node positions at time t + ∆t. In our study, ∆t is 5 seconds, i.e., 150
graphs as default for 30 fps video. The node attributes include objects’ horizontal and vertical
positions, object box size, and RGB colors in the center, on the left, right, top, and bottom of the
box. The relational links include spatial relationships between nodes within a graph and the dynamic
relationship of the same node in neighboring graphs. Spatial and dynamic patterns are preserved
by this dynamic GNN model. The boxes were identified by CNN tools, so no human annotation is
needed in the training process.
ii) We use federated learning (FL) to train one dynamic GNN model across devices without exchanging
training data. With FL, individual cameras compute the model updates (e.g., gradients, updated
weights) locally, and only these model updates are shared with the central server (called parameter
server) who trains a global model using the aggregated updates collected from individual devices.
The parameter server then shares the trained model with all other devices. FL provides a viable
platform for state-of-the-art ML, and it is privacy-friendly because the training data never leaves
individuals.
iii) We employ secure aggregation to prevent inference attacks launched by malicious parameter
servers. Secure aggregation is a primitive that allows a third party aggregator to efficiently compute
an aggregate function (e.g., product, sum, average) over individuals’ private input values. When this
primitive is applied to FL, the parameter server can access the aggregated model only, and adversaries
can no longer launch the aforementioned inference attacks to infer individuals’ training data.
In our experiments, we use Stanford Drone Dataset1 published by the Stanford Computational Vision
Geometry Lab. The large-scale dataset collects images and videos of various types of agents (e.g.,
pedestrians, bicyclists, skateboarders, cars, buses, and golf carts) that navigate in university campus
[37]. We use videos in four scenes such as “bookstore,” “coupa,” “hyang,” and “little.” Experimental
results demonstrate that the proposed framework can consistently deliver good performance in an
unsupervised, distributed, secured manner.
2 Dynamic GNN for Learning Surveillance Video
Given a video, suppose the video frame at time t has been processed to form an attributed graph
G(t) = (V (t), p(t), g(t), e(t)) using object detection techniques (e.g., CNN-based, or as processed in
the Stanford Drone Dataset), where
1https://cvgl.stanford.edu/projects/uav_data/
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Secure Aggregation Primitives
Figure 1: Dynamic GNN aggregates spatial information within graphs and temporal information
across neighboring graphs. It is trained by the MSE loss on the task of predicting future positions of
objects. (Left) We protect federated averaging functions with novel secure aggregation primitives to
prevent inference attack by malicious parameter servers. (Right)
• V (t) is the set of nodes (i.e., moving objects [45]);
• p(t)(v) = [p(t)x (v), p
(t)
y (v)] : V (t) → R2 gives two position values (i.e., horizontal and
vertical positions) of the center of object v in the frame;
• g(t)(v) : V (t) → Rk gives k features of object v such as red/green/blue values on the left
and right, at the top and bottom, and in the center;
• e(t)(u, v) : V (t) × V (t) → R gives the weight of the link between nodes u and v – the
weight can be the Euclidean distance between the two nodes on the frame:
e(t)(u, v) = ‖p(t)(u)− p(t)(v)‖2, u, v ∈ V (t). (1)
Given a video with frames at 1 . . . T , we have attributed graph sequence G(t)|Tt=1. We denote the
set of nodes in the graph sequence by V = ∪Tt=1V (t). The goal of our approach is to learn the
representations of each node (called node embeddings) in each graph that preserve spatial information
in the graph and dynamic information of the node through past graphs: f(v, t) : V ×{1 . . . T} → Rd,
denoted by v(t), where d is the number of dimensions of node embeddings. The node embeddings
can be used for tasks such as object tracking, forecasting, and malicious behavior detection.
Our proposed GNN model has two parts: One is an algorithm for node embedding generation given
raw data and model parameters; the other are loss function(s) based on self-supervised task(s) for
training the model parameters.
Node embedding generation: First, we use matrix M ∈ Rd×(k+2) to transform from node’s raw
features [p(t)(v), g(t)(v)] to the initial latent embeddings v(t)0 ∈ Rd:
v
(t)
0 = σ
(
M · [p(t)(v), g(t)(v)]
)
, (2)
where σ(·) is an activation function, which can be sigmoid, hyperbolic tangent, ReLU, etc.
Second, for the i-th layer of the neural network (i ∈ {1 . . . n}, where n is the number of layers),
which means in the i-th iteration of the embedding generation algorithm, we generate the embedding
vector v(t)i ∈ Rd for node v in graph G(t) as follows:
v
(t)
i = σ
(
α ·Bi · AGGu∈V (t−1)\{v}pi(e(t−1)(u, v)) · u(t−1)i−1 + β ·Wi · v(t−1)i−1 + (1− α− β) · v(t)i−1
)
,
(3)
where (1) u(t−1)i−1 is the embedding vector of node u as a neighboring node of v in graph G
(t−1) at the
(i−1)-th iteration; v(t−1)i−1 is the embedding vector of node v in graphG(t−1) at the (i−1)-th iteration;
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v
(t)
i−1 is the embedding vector of node v in graph G
(t) at the (i− 1)-th iteration; (2) Bi ∈ Rd×d is
the transformation matrix from the aggregated information of neighboring nodes on the (i− 1)-th
layer to the i-th layer; Wi ∈ Rd×d is the transformation matrix from the embedding of a node on the
(i− 1)-th layer to the i-th layer; (3) α is a hyperparameter weighting the aggregation of neighboring
nodes in the previous graph; β is a hyperparameter weighting the node in the previous graph; (4)
AGG is an aggregation function, which can be mean pooling, max pooling, or LSTM aggregator, and
(5) pi(e) defines the importance of aggregating from a neighboring node: A shorter distance (i.e.,
weight on the link between the two nodes) indicates a higher importance, so one choice is pi(e) = 1e .
The final embedding vectors are {vˆ(t) ≡ v(t)n }|Tt=1, generated with model parameters including M,
Bi|ni=1, and Wi|ni=1 from graph sequence data G(t)|Tt=1. Each final embedding vector vˆ(t) preserves
structural and dynamic information of node v in Gmin{t−n,1} . . . , G(t−1), G(t).
Self-supervised loss: We expect the final embedding vector vˆ(t) can be predictive for future values
of node’s positions which can be denoted by [p(t+∆t)x (v), p
(t+∆t)
y (v)], i.e., v’s positions after ∆t
frames. So we have the loss below by introducing A ∈ R2×d from latent space to position space:
L(M,Bi|ni=1,Wi|ni=1,A) =
T−∆t∑
t=2
∑
v∈V (t)
‖p(t+∆t)(v)−A · vˆ(t)‖2. (4)
Complexity analysis: The time complexity of the Dynamic GNN is O(rnd2
∑T
t=1 |V (t)|), where n
is the number of layers, r ≤ |V (t)| is the number of spatial neighbors for each node, and d is the
number of dimensions of node embeddings. The memory complexity is O(rnd+ nd2). Usually, the
number of objects |V (t)| in a single graph is not too big (often between 2 and 10). And n is usually 1,
2, or 3. When |V (t)| turns to be too big, we can sample r spatial neighbors for the training [16].
3 Federated Learning for Training Distributed Dynamic GNNs
Joint optimization with multi-user graph sequences from distributed cameras. Given m videos,
which can be represented as G(j,t)|j=m,t=Tjj=1,t=1 , where Tj is the number of graphs (i.e., video frames)
in the j-th graph sequence (i.e., video), we extend the dynamic GNN algorithm presented above to
generate final embedding vectors vˆ(j,t)|j=m,t=Tjj=1,t=1 and extend the self-supervised loss as follows:
L =
m∑
j=1
Tj−∆t∑
t=2
∑
v∈V (j,t)
‖p(j,t+∆t)(v)−A · vˆ(j,t)‖2. (5)
Federated optimization. Privacy, security, and scalability have become critical concerns in dis-
tributed surveillance [6]. An approach that has the potential to address these problems is federated
learning [22]. Federated learning (FL) is an emerging decentralized privacy-protection training
technology that enables clients to learn a shared global model without uploading their private local
data to a central server. In each training round, a local device downloads a shared model from
the central server, trains the downloaded model over the individuals’ local data and then sends the
updated weights or gradients back to the server. On the server, the uploaded models from the clients
are aggregated to obtain a new global model [48, 44]. Federated dynamic GNN aims to minimize the
loss function in Equation (5) but in a distributed scheme:
min
Θ
L(Θ) =
m∑
j=1
Nj
N
Lj(Θ), where L(j)(Θ) = 1
Nj
∑
v∈V (j,:)
Lv(Θ), (6)
where the size of data indexesNj =
∑
t |V (j,t)| andN =
∑
j Nj , j is the index ofm clients, L(j)(Θ)
is the loss function of the j-th local client, and Θ represents neural parameters of the dynamic GNN
model. Optimizing the loss function L(Θ) in FL is equivalent to minimizing the weighted average of
local loss function L(Θ).
Each user performs local training to calculate individual loss L(j)(M,Bi|ni=1,Wi|ni=1,A) (for the
j-th user), after the loss gradient ∇L(j)(M,Bi|ni=1,Wi|ni=1,A) is calculated. Each user submits
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this individual gradient to a central parameter server who takes the following gradient descent step:
Θt+1 ← Θt − η · FEDAVGj=1...m
(
αj∇L(j)(M,Bi|ni=1,Wi|ni=1,A)
)
, (7)
where t is for iteration (not time or graph index), Θ is for neural network parameters, η is the learning
rate, and αj is the weight of the j-th user’s individual gradient in the weighted average FEDAVG.
αj is usually proportional to the size of the user’s dataset. The algorithm based on FEDAVG can
effectively reduce communication rounds by simultaneously increasing local training epochs and
decreasing local mini-batch sizes [30, 48].
4 Privacy-preserving FL with Improved Secure Aggregation
Regular FL without explicit security mechanisms has been shown to be vulnerable to various inference
attacks [31, 32, 42, 1, 14]. Namely, adversaries who observe the updates of individual models become
able to infer significant information about the individual training datasets (e.g., distribution of the
training datasets or even samples or training datasets). When the parameter server in the FL is
compromised, individual data (e.g., raw videos or the features) is compromised as well with the
inference attacks.
A secure aggregation scheme allows a group of distrustful users ν ∈ U (U is the set of m users) with
private input xν to compute an aggregate value FEDAVGν∈Uxν such as
∑
ν∈U xνwithout disclosing
individual xν’s to others. Similar to existing work [4–6], we leverage secure aggregation to thwart
attacks. However, we take advantage of different approaches and mitigate their shortcomings.
Secure aggregation with pair-wise one-time pads. In the secure aggregation adopted by Bonawitz
et al. [4–6], a user ν chooses a random number sν,µ ∈ Zq for every other user µ, where Zq is a
set of integers {0, 1, · · · , q − 1}. Specially, sν,µ = 0 if ν = µ. Then, all pairs of users ν and µ
exchange sν,µ and sµ,ν over secure communication channels and compute the one-time pads as
pν,µ = sν,µ− sµ,ν . Then, each user masks xν as yν = xν +
∑
µ∈U pν,µ mod q. Every user ν sends
yν to the server who computes the sum over yν . Then, it follows that∑
ν∈U
yν =
∑
ν∈U
xν+
∑
ν∈U
∑
µ∈U
pν,µ =
∑
ν∈U
xν+
∑
ν∈U
∑
µ∈U
sν,µ−
∑
ν∈U
∑
µ∈U
sµ,ν =
∑
ν∈U
xν (mod q) (8)
Such masking with one-time padding guarantees perfect secrecy (i.e., no information about xν is
revealed from yν) as long as the bit length of q is larger than the bit length of xν . Such secure
aggregation requires that all users frequently share one-time pads at every aggregation, because the
one-time pads cannot be reused. This leads to high communication overhead among the users. The
benefit of such a scheme is that it does not rely on a trusted key dealer unlike the following scheme.
Secure aggregation of time-series data. In the secure aggregation for time-series data [41, 19], a
trusted key dealer randomly samples for each user ν ∈ U their one-time pads {pν}|ν∈U from Z such
that
∑
ν∈U pν = 0. This can be done trivially by choosing the first |U | − 1 numbers randomly and let
the last number be the negative sum of the |U | − 1 numbers (note that −x is equal to q − x modulo
q for any x ∈ Zq). Then, each pν is securely distributed to each user via secure communication
channels. Each user ν then masks xν as yν = (1 +N)xνH(t)pν mod N2, where H : T → ZN2 is
a cryptographic hash function, t is the time at which the aggregation needs to be performed, and N is
the product of two distinct unknown prime numbers (i.e., RSA number). Then, it follows that:
(
∏
ν∈U
yν
)
=
∏
ν∈U
H(t)pν ·
∏
ν∈U
(1 +N)xν = (1 +N)
∑
ν∈U xν = (1 +N
∑
ν∈U
xν) (mod N2), (9)
where the last equality holds due to the binomial theorem, i.e., (1 +N)x = 1 + xN (mod N2). Then,
it further follows that: (
(
∏
ν∈U yν)− 1
)
mod N2
N
mod N =
∑
ν∈U
xν . (10)
Such masking guarantees semantic security (i.e., no statistical information about xν is disclosed from
yν) as long as N is sufficiently large and the Decision Composite Residuosity (DCR) problem [19]
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becomes hard. Such secure aggregation requires a trusted key dealer who performs the computation,
however such an entity is hard to find in real-life applications. Even if there is one, it becomes the
single-point-of-failure whose compromise leads to the compromise of the whole system. The benefit
of such scheme is that it does not require frequent key sharing because H(t)pν is computationally
indistinguishable from a random number from ZN2 as long as pν is kept secret, and users can re-use
pν over and over as long as no same t is used in the aggregation.
Our improved secure aggregation. We present our secure aggregation scheme that takes the best
of the both worlds. Namely, we combine the two types of secure aggregation schemes above to let
users re-use the shared pads/keys without extra sharing or trusted key dealers.
We first let all users {ν}|ν∈U generate the one-time pads pν,µ in the same way as in the secure
aggregation with pair-wise one-time pads. Then, we let every user calculate pν =
∑
µ∈U pν,µ,
whose sum
∑
ν∈U pν is equal to 0 for some modulus. Then, we let all users use these {pν}|ν∈U to
participate in the secure aggregation of time-series data. By doing so, users can useH(t)’s and pν’s to
mask their inputs without relying on a trusted key dealer. At the same time, they can re-use the same
pads pν’s repeatedly as long as H(t) is different every time. Informally, such a masking guarantees
the correct aggregation at the parameter server side, and it also guarantees that adversaries cannot
infer any information related to individual users’ input data other than the length of the masked data.
We present formal definitions and proofs in the appendix.
Mapping between real numbers and integers. All the computations in our secure aggregation
scheme are integer computations, and we need to use integers to represent real numbers. We leverage
the fixed point representation [20]. Given a real number x, its fixed point representation is given by
[x] = bx ·2ee for a fixed integer e. Then, it follows that [x±y] = [x]± [y]. With such homomorphism,
users can convert a real number x to its integer version [x] and participate in the secure aggregation.
The third-party aggregator can compute the sum
∑
ν∈U [xν ] which is equal to [
∑
ν∈U xν ], and one
can approximately compute
∑
ν∈U xν by computing the following division:
∑
ν∈U xν ≈
[
∑
ν∈U xν ]
2e .
The approximation error is bounded above by 2−(e+1)|U |.
5 Experiments
5.1 Experimental settings
Scene #Edges Train Valid. Test Bic. Ped. Skate. Cart Car Bus
bookstore 2,112 578 298 869 32.89 63.94 1.63 0.34 0.83 0.37
coupa 4,901 553 717 2,002 18.89 80.61 0.17 0.17 0.17 0
hyang 3,076 822 199 1,813 27.68 70.01 1.29 0.43 0.50 0.09
little 4,413 485 602 1,519 56.04 42.46 0.67 0 0.17 0.67
Table 1: Statistics of four video datasets (graph sequences). Objects in the videos have various types
(in %): Bic. = Bicyclist, Ped. = Pedestrian, Skate. = Skateboarder.
Graph sequence data. We transform videos in the Stanford Drone Dataset into graph sequences.
Each 30-fps video spans over 10,000 frames (i.e., over 333 seconds). We use the first minute for
training, last 3 minutes for testing, and the last 4th for validation. Statistics can be found in Table 1.
Parameter settings. The number of object’s raw features is k+2: 2 is for the object box’s horizontal
and vertical positions. k = 17 is for box width, box height, and RGB colors at the center, left, right,
top, and bottom of the box. The hyperparameters α is set as 0.1, β is set as 0.1 and the number of
layers is set as 2 for the best performance. Here α is the weight for aggregating spatial information
from neighbors; β is the weight for aggregating dynamic information from neighboring graphs. The
aggregation is applied every 10 epochs.
We will set the number of dimensions of node embeddings d a value in {32, 64, 128, 256, 512}. We
will simulate federated learning with the number of users m in {1, 2, 5, 10}. m = 1 means we disable
federated optimization but have all data on a single user.
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(a) Stanford Bookstore (bookstore): 1424×1088 (b) Stanford Coupa Cafe (coupa): 1980×1093
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(c) Huang Y2E2 Buildings (hyang): 1340×1730 (d) Littlefield Center (little): 1322×1945
Figure 2: Results on predicting horizontal position px (top left), predicting vertical position py (top
right), and running time (bottom left) as well as an example video frame (bottom right).
Computational resource. Our machine is an iMac with 4.2 GHz Quad-Core Intel Core i7, 32GB
2400 MHz DDR4 memory, and Radeon Pro 580 8GB Graphics.
5.2 Results on effectiveness
Figure 2 presents experimental results in four different scenes. We use Root Mean Square Error
(RMSE) to evaluate the performance of predicting horizontal position px and vertical position py.
We observe, first, the RMSE of Federated Dynamic GNN (Feddy) for any number of users and any
number of dimensions is smaller than the best method (i.e., MLP) on learning raw features. Second,
Feddy performs better when the number of dimensions d is bigger. When d ≥ 128, the performances
under different number of users (1, 2, 5, or 10) show very small difference. It means federated
optimization achieves a consistent global model.
5.3 Results on efficiency
From the bar charts in Figure 2 we observe that when the number of user m > 1, which enables
federated optimization, the time cost is higher than that of m = 1. However, it does not become
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Figure 3: Computation and communication costs of secure aggregation per user
significantly higher as m becomes bigger. Time cost under different m values is comparable. The
time cost of non-federated learning with the number of dimensions d = 512 is close to that of
federated learning with d = 32. Feddy’s time cost is 1.5× to 3× of that of non-federated GNN.
5.4 Results on secure aggregation
Masking at the user side and the aggregation at the parameter server side are computationally
expensive, however the masking and the aggregation for all weights can be computed in parallel.
Therefore, we implemented a parallel program for the secure aggregation algorithms, where masking
and aggregation are parallelized, and performed a simulation to measure the computation costs. COTS
smart cameras are equipped with quad-core processors (e.g., NEON-1040 by ADLINK), therefore we
performed the simulation with 4 threads and measured the end-to-end elapsed time for each user. We
repeated all simulation for 50 times and measured the average. All parameters are chosen such that
we have 112-bit security as recommended by NIST [3] (the bidwith of pν’s is 118 bits, the bitwidth
of N is 2048 bits, etc.).
The costs of key generation (Figure 3(a)) is negligible. Although they grow linearly w.r.t. the number
of users, the key generation is a one-time process, therefore the overhead of the key generation is
negligible. The masking (Figure 3(b)), however, is not negligible. The costs grow linearly with the
number of users and quadratically with the dimension. The size of keys grow linearly w.r.t. the
number of users (since pν =
∑
µ∈U pν,µ) up to the modulus, therefore the costs will not grow after
the number of users reaches certain point. However, it is unavoidable to have a quadratic growth
because the number of the parameters that need to be masked and shared are quadratic w.r.t. the
dimension. Still, the costs of masking are acceptable because the aggregation via Feddy occurs once
every 10 epochs, and the cost of the masking is comparable to the total costs of the GNN training
during those epochs. This is a tradeoff one needs to make to achieve a strong provable data security.
The aggregation performed by the parameter server (Figure 3(c)) is negligible, since the aggregation
occurs once every 10 epochs. The costs grow linearly with the number of users, however reasonably
strong servers can handle such computation. Finally, we present the total size of the messages one
user needs to receive from all other users (Figure 3(d)). There are non-negligible communication
costs caused by the masking, and this is also the tradeoff for the sake of provable security.
6 Related Work
Dynamic/evolutionary GNN. GNN models have been developed to learn static graph data [18, 34,
13, 17, 39, 40]. Dynamic graph embeddings are expected to preserve specific structures such as triadic
closure processes [47], attribute-value dynamics [24], continuous-time patterns [33], interaction
trajectories [23], and out-of-sample nodes [28]. Graph convolutional networks are equipped with self-
attention mechanisms [38], Markov mechanisms [36], or recurrent models [35] for dynamic graph
learning [29]. We focus on modeling spatial and dynamic information in video graph sequences.
Federated machine learning. As clients have become more powerful and communication efficient,
developing deep networks for decentralized data has attracted lots of research [30, 22]. Federated
optimization algorithms can distribute optimization beyond datacenters [21]. Bonawitz et al. proposed
a new system design to implement at scale [6, 48]. Yang et al. presented concepts (forming a new
ontology) and methods on employing federated learning in machine learning applications [44].
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Secure aggregation on time-series data. Bonawitz et al. developed practical secure aggregation for
federated learning on user-held data [4] and for privacy-preserving machine learning [5]. However,
those methods cannot be directly applied for time-series or sequential data. Existing work on privacy-
preserving aggregation of time-series data needs semantic analysis on dynamic user groups using
state-of-the-art machine learning [41, 19, 20].
7 Conclusions
We presented Federated Dynamic Graph Neural Network, a distributed and secure framework to learn
the object representations from multi-user graph sequences. It aggregates both spatial and dynamic
information and uses a self-supervised loss of predicting the trajectories of objects. It is trained in
a federated learning manner. The centrally located server sends the model to user devices. Local
models on the respective user devices learn and periodically send their learning to the central server
without ever exposing the user’s data to the server. We design secure aggregation primitives that
protect the security and privacy in federated learning with scalability. Experiments on four real-world
video camera datasets demonstrated that Feddy achieves great effectiveness and security.
Broader impacts
This paper presents provably secure federated learning based on a novel secure aggregation scheme.
Specifically, this paper addresses the data security issues in the federated learning for the GNN, which
is a promising deep learning framework for time-series video datasets. Considering the sensitivity of
the video data collected by surveillance cameras, the broader impacts of this paper lie in the enhanced
data security which leads to enhanced cybersecurity and individual privacy.
The increased computation and communication costs may negatively impact the broader impacts,
however there is active research in applied cryptography for accelerating cryptographic primitives.
Therefore, the negative impacts from the increased overhead will be mitigated over time.
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A Correctness of Feddy
We rigorously prove that the secure aggregation employed in Feddy correctly let parameter server
compute the aggregated values.
Theorem 1. Suppose
∑
ν∈U pν = 0 (mod N) and H is defined as H : T → GH , where GH is a
multiplicative cyclic group of order N with multiplication modulo N2 being the multiplicative group
operator. Then, we have:(
(
∏
ν∈U yν)− 1
)
mod N2
N
mod N =
∑
ν∈U
xν .
Note that the H above can be easily constructed as H(t) := (rϕ(N))t if rϕ(N) is included in the
system-wide parameters. This can be done securely either by employing a crypto server who generates
the system-wide parameters and destroys all secret values [20], or by employing a secure multi-party
computation protocol that generates RSA keys [12]. We adopt the former approach in this paper.
Proof. We start by simplifying ((
∏
ν∈U yν)−1) mod N2
N .(
(
∏
ν∈U yν)− 1
)
mod N2
N
=
((∏
ν∈U (1 +N)
xνH(t)pν
)− 1) mod N2
N
=
(
(1 +N)
∑
ν∈U xνH(t)
∑
ν∈U pν − 1
)
mod N2
N
(due to the binomial theorem)
=
(
(1 +N
∑
ν∈U xν)H(t)
∑
ν∈U pν − 1
)
mod N2
N
(because the order of the group GH is N )
=
(
(1 +N
∑
ν∈U xν)− 1
)
mod N2
N
=
(
(1 +N
∑
ν∈U xν)− 1
)
mod N2
N
=
N
∑
ν∈U xν mod N
2
N
=
(N
∑
ν∈U xν)− kN2
N
for some integer k
= (
∑
ν∈U
xν)− kN for some integer k
Then, it follows that ((
∏
ν∈U yν)−1) mod N2
N mod N =
∑
ν∈U xν . Note that N is much larger than
xν’s, so
∑
ν∈U xν will not likely exceed the modulus N . For example, in our implementation, N ’s
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bitwidth is 2048 bits (i.e., as large as 22048) while xνs’ bitwidths are less than 100 bits. In such a
parameter setting, we can add at least 21948 xν’s without exceeding the modulus N . Therefore, in
practical settings where we are dealing with gradients of the neural networks, we do not need to
worry about the result being incorrect due to the modulus overflow issues.
Then, since
∑
ν∈U xν can be calculated correctly with Feddy, the parameter server can map the integer
sum to the real-number sum, which yields the aggregated gradients. Recall that the approximation
error caused by integer-real approximation with the fixed-point representation is bounded above by
2−(e+1)|U | as described in Section 4.
B Security of Feddy
Here we present a privacy analysis of the framework inspired by [20]. In general this uses standard
techniques for proving indistinguishability (IND-CPA) [19, 2].
B.1 Adversary Model
Note that due to privacy concerns, the result of the analytical computation should only be given
to the aggregator (parameter server), and any user’s data should be kept secret from anyone else
but the owner unless it is deducible from the aggregated value. Additionally, both users and the
aggregator are assumed to be semi-honest adaptive adversaries. Informally, these adversaries will
follow the protocol specifications correctly, but they may perform extra computation to try to infer
others’ private values (i.e., semi-honest), and the computation they perform can be based on their
historical observation (i.e., adaptive). For our scenario, if users tamper with the protocol (i.e., not
following the protocol specifications correctly), it is highly likely that the aggregator will detect it
since the outcome of the protocol will not be in a valid range due to the cryptographic operations on
large integers. However, the aggregator is interested in recovering the correct result, so they will not
be motivated to attempt to maliciously tamper with the protocol. Note that users may report a value
with small deviation such that the analytic result still appears reasonable for many reasons (by mistake
etc.), but evaluating the reliability of the reported value is beyond the scope of this paper. Also note
that adversaries are adaptive in the sense that they may produce their public values adaptively after
seeing others’ public values. We assume all the communication channels are open to anyone (i.e. as a
result anyone can overhear/synthesize any message).
B.2 Security Definition
To formally define the security of the framework, we present a precise definition of Feddy:
Definition B.1. Our Federated Dynamic Graph Neural Network (Feddy) is the collection of the
following four polynomial time algorithms: Setup, KeyGen, Mask, and Aggregate.
Setup(1κ) −→ params is a probabilistic setup algorithm that is run by a crypto server (which is
different from the parameter server) to generate system-wide public parameters that define the integer
groups/rings the protocols will be operated on, denoted params given a security parameter κ as
input.
KeyGen(params) −→ {EKν}ν is a probabilistic and distributed algorithm jointly run by the users.
Each user ν ∈ U will secretly receive his own secret key EKν .
Mask(xν , EKν , T ) −→ yν = (1 +N)xνH(t)pν is a deterministic algorithm run by each user i to
mask his private value xν into the maksed value yν using t ∈ Tf . The output yν is published in an
insecure channel.
Aggregate(yν |∀ν ∈ U) −→
∑
ν∈U (xν) is run by the aggregator to aggregate all the encoded
private values C(xν)’s to calculate the sum over {xν}ν∈U .
The security of the aggregation is formally defined via a data publishing game (Figure 4), similar to
[20].
We define the security of the masking in Feddy as follows:
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Setup:) 3 disjoint time domains are chosen: T1 for phase 1, T2 for phase 2, and Tc for the
challenge phase.
Init:) The adversary declares their role in the scheme (i.e., aggregator or user), and the challenger
controls the remaining users. The users engage in the key generation.
Phase 1 in T1:) The adversary submits polynomially many queries to the masking oraclea
and receive the masked values for any x and any time window T ⊆ T1 and any user in U
including those are not adversaries. If the declared time windows do not overlap with each other,
the masking oracles returns all masked values to the adversary; otherwise, adversaries receive
nothing.
Challenge in Tc:) The adversary declares the target time window Tc. Then, they submit two sets
of values {xν,1}, {xν,2}, such that
∑
ν∈U xν,1 =
∑
ν∈U xν,2, to the challenger. The challenger
flips a fair binary coin b and generate the masked values {yν,b} based on xν,b, which are given
to the adversary.
Phase 2 in T2:) Phase 1 is repeated adaptively, but the time window T should be a subset of T2.
Guess:) The adversary gives a guess b′ on b. The advantage of the adversary in this game is
defined advA = |Pr[b′ − b]− 12 |.
aThe masking oracle’s role is to return the masked values when x, t, and ν are given.
Figure 4: Data Publishing Game
Definition B.2. The random masking in the Feddy is indistinguishable against the chosen-plaintext
attack (IND-CPA) if all polynomial time adversaries’ advantages in the game are of a negligible
function w.r.t. the security parameter κ when T1, T2, and Tc are three disjoint time domains.
Next, we present a standard simulation-based definition of the security [27, 8, 15], that is achieved
by our Feddy protocol. Note that Feddy is not an encryption scheme, and although we leverage
Definition B.2 to prove security later, techniques such as proving IND-CCA or IND-CPA alone do
not directly demonstrate the security of the entire protocol. Informally speaking, the Feddy scheme
is private if adversaries do not gain more information than the input that they control, the output, and
what can be inferred from each of them.
We define the security of Feddy as follows:
Definition B.3. The aggregation scheme Feddy for a class of summation functions F is said to be
private for F against semi-honest adversaries if for any f ∈ F and for any probabilistic polynomial
time adversary A controlling a subset A of all players, there exists a probabilistic polynomial-time
simulator S such that for any set of inputs X := (x1, · · · , xn) in the domain of f where the i-th
player Pi controls xi,
{S(f(X), A, {xj | Pj ∈ A})}κ c≡ {ViewFeddyA (X)}κ
where
c≡ refers to computational indistinguishability, κ is the security parameter, and ViewFeddyA (X)
represents the messages received by members of A during execution of protocol Feddy.
B.3 Security Proof
Before we present the security proofs, we present the computational problems and the hardness
assumptions Feddy relies on.
Definition B.4. Decisional Diffie-Hellman (DDH) problem in a group G with generator g is to
decide whether gc = gab given a triple (ga, gb, gc), where a, b, c ∈ Z. An algorithm A’s advantage
in solving the DDH problem is defined as
advDDHA,G =
∣∣∣Pr[1← A(ga, gb, gab ∈ G)]
−Pr[1← A(ga, gb, gc ∈ G)∣∣c←R Z]∣∣∣
where 1← A(·) if the algorithm outputs ‘yes’ and 0 otherwise, and the probabilities are taken over
the uniform random selection c←R Z as well as the random bits of A.
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Definition B.5. Decisional Composite Residuosity (DCR) problem in Z∗N2 is to decide whether a
given element x ∈ Z∗N2 is an N -th residue modulo N2 or not.
The DDH problem in Z∗N and the DCR problem are widely belived to be intractable [20, 19, 7]. We
will prove the security of Feddy by proving the following theorem.
Theorem 2. With the assumptions that the DDH problem is hard in Z∗N and that the DCR problem is
hard, the random masking in our Feddy scheme is indistinguishable against chosen-plaintext attacks
(IND-CPA) under the random oracle model. Namely, for any PPTA A, its advantage advA in the data
publishing game is bounded as follows:
advA ≤ e (qc + 1)
2
qc
· advDDHA
where e is the base of the natural logarithm, qc is the number of adversaries’ queries submitted to the
masking oracle, and advDDHA is the advantage in solving the DDH problem. Note that adv
DDH
A is
negligibly small since DDH problem is widely believed to be hard.
We prove the theorem by adapting the proofs from [20, 19].
Proof. To prove the theorem, we present three games Game 1, Game 2, and Game 3, in which we
use A and B to denote the adversary and the challenger. For each l ∈ {1, 2, 3}, we denote El as the
event that B outputs 1 in the Game l, and we define advl =
∣∣Pr [El]− 12 ∣∣
Game 1:) This game is exactly identical to the earlier data publishing game. A ’s masking queries
(T, {xν}ν) are answered by returning the masked values {yν}ν . In the challenge phase, the adversaryA the associated time window Tc, and two sets of values {xν,1}, {xν,2} which satisfy
∑
ν∈U xν,1 =∑
ν∈U xν,2. Then, the challenger B returns the corresponding masked values to the adversary
A. When the game terminates, B outputs 1 if b′ = b and 0 otherwise. By definition, adv1 =∣∣Pr [E1]− 12 ∣∣ = advA
Game 2:) In Game 2 , the adversary A and the challenger B repeat the same operations as in Game 1
using the same time windows of those operations. However, for each masking query in Game 1 at
time t ∈ T1 ∪ T2, the challenger B flips a biased binary coinµT for the entire time window T which
takes 1 with probability 1qc+1 and 0 with probability
qc
qc+1
. When the Game 2 terminates, B checks
whether any µT = 1. If there is any, B outputs a random bit. Otherwise, B outputs 1 if b′ = b and
0 if b′ 6= b. If we denote F as the event that µTf = 1 for any Tf , the analysis in [11] shows that
Pr[F¯ ] = 1e(qc+1) . According to [19] Game 1 to Game 2 is a transition based on a failure event of
large probability, and therefore we have adv2 = adv1 Pr[F¯ ] = adv1e(qc+1) .
Game 3:) In this game, the adversary A and the challenger B repeat the same operations as in Game
1 using the same time windows of those operations. However, there is a change in the answers to the
masking queries (T, {xν}ν) . The oracle will respond to the query with the following masked values:
∀ν : yν =
{
(1 +N)xνH (t)
pν µT = 1
(1 +N)xν (H (t)
s
)
pν µT = 0
where s is a uniform randomly chosen element from ZN that is fixed for the same aggregation.
When Game 3 terminates, B outputs 1 if b′ = b and 0 otherwise. Due to Lemma 8 from [20],
distinguishing Game 3 from Game 2 is at least as hard as a DDH problem in ZN for any adversary A
in Game 2 and Game 3. It follows then: |Pr [E2]− Pr [E3]| ≤ advDDHA . The answers to masking
queries in Game 3 are identical to those of Game 2 with probability 1qc+1 and different from those
of Game 2 with probability qcqc+1 . In the latter case, due to the random element s, yν is uniformly
distributed in the subgroup 〈H(t)〉 which completely blinds (1 + N)xν and A can only randomly
guess b′ unless he can solve the DCR problem with non-negligible advantages (which is false under
our assumption that the DCR problem is hard). Then, b′ = b with probability 1/2, and the total
probability Pr [E3] =
Pr[E2]
qc+1
+ qc2(qc+1) . Then, we have:
|Pr [E2]− Pr [E3]| =
∣∣∣∣(Pr [E2]− 1/2) · qcqc + 1
∣∣∣∣ = adv2 · qcqc + 1 ≤ advDDHA
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Combining the above inequality with the advantages deduced from Game 1 and Game 2 , we finally
have:
adv2 · qc
qc + 1
= advA · qc
e (qc + 1)
2 ≤ advDDHA
thus completing the proof.
With the above, we are now ready to prove the security of Feddy in the well known simulation
security model [27] in the following theorem:
Theorem 3. Assuming |C| = O(log κ), all parties properly instantiate and use the Feddy algorithms
in Definition B.1, and the random masking in Definition B.2 is used, our scheme Feddy privately
computes according to Definition B.3
Proof. Without loss of generality, assume the adversary controls the first m < n variables, where n is
the total number of all variables in the scheme (i.e. each person j participating in the protocol inputs
a collection of private variables (e.g. xj,1, · · · , xj,rj ) where user j controls rj variables and the total
number of variables for all participants sums to n variables). We show that a probabilistic polynomial
time simulator can generate an entire simulated view, given z = f(x1, · · · , xm, xm+1, · · · , xn) and
x1, · · ·xm for an adversary indistinguishable from the view an adversary sees in a real execution
of the protocol. Note the simulator is able to find x′m+1, · · · , x′n such that z = f(x′1, · · · , x′m,
x′m+1, · · · , x′n) in polynomial time since |C| = O(log κ). Besides this, the adversary follows the
protocol as described in Figure B.1, pretending to be honest. Note that in any world (i.e. Ideal or
Real), the adversary can only compute the function over the fixed values submitted by the honest
users, because the adversary can only access the fully aggregated set of submitted values. Individual
values submitted by the honest players are secure by the IND-CPA property of the underlying
masking scheme as shown in the proof of Theorem B.3. Now the simulator S generates a view
indistinguishable from that of a real execution, since all parameters broadcast i.e. x′ν masked by p
′
ν ,
are indistinguishable from the corresponding ones in the real protocol i.e. xν masked by pν as they
are generated identically and have the exact same distribution i.e. a uniformly random distribution.
More specifically all masked values are indistinguishable in both worlds as both sets of masks are
generated at random and will have the same random distribution, i.e. the masked values in both
worlds will be indistinguishable from random, and thus indistinguishable from each other. Recall that
the aggregator does not send the result to users (note that if the users tamper with their submissions
the aggregator will likely detect it since the outcome of the protocol will not be in a valid range; the
aggregator can abort if necessary depending on the use case of the protocol). Similarly, masked values
sent to the aggregator in both worlds will also be indistinguishable by the assumption that the users
correctly follow the protocol, which utilizes IND-CPA secure masking, and the fact that we chose
inputs that give the same output. By the security of the DCR and DDH problems, no information can
be gained by an adversary intercepting messages. This demonstrates that for the class of functions F ,
our protocol is secure against adversaries A since:
{S(f(X), A, {xj | Pj ∈ A})}κ c≡ {ViewFeddyA (X)}κ
Therefore, the adversary cannot distinguish between real and simulated executions and our protocol
securely computes as defined in Definition B.3.
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